Irina Mikhalevich and Russell Powell, Minds without spines: Evolutionarily inclusive animal ethics


Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the evidence for sentience in invertebrates. They do not offer any examples, however, of how their welfare should be considered or improved. We draw on animal welfare science to suggest some ways that would not be excessively demanding.

Author Biography

Heather Browning is a zookeeper and PhD candidate in the School of Philosophy at the Australian National University, working on conceptual and methodological issues in the measurement of consciousness and animal welfare. Website

Walter Veit is a PhD candidate in the School of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Sydney. His dissertation is on the origins of sentience and consciousness as a “mere” byproduct of the evolution of damage detection, nociception, and pain. Website