Delon, Nicolas; Cook, Peter; Bauer, Gordon; and Harley, Heidi (2020) Consider the agent in the arthropod. Animal Sentience 29(32)
Irina Mikhalevich and Russell Powell, Minds without spines: Evolutionarily inclusive animal ethics
Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and requires that we consider their welfare.
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