Colin A. Chapman and Michael A. Huffman, Why do we want to think humans are different?


Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human animals may be more challenging than Chapman & Huffman suggest. The reasons for this also go against their recommendation that we ought to attend to how humans and non-humans are similar. The problem lies in identifying the moral relevance of biological characteristics. There are, however, other reasons for treating non-human animals as worthy of moral consideration, such as the Precautionary Principle.

Author Biography

S. Brian Hood is Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at the University of West Florida. His research interests include animal ethics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of psychiatry. He has written on the concept of validity in psychometrics, the practical relevance of debates in the philosophy of science for clinical psychologists, and other topics. Website

Sophia Giddens is a senior at the University of West Florida. Her interests include philosophy of science, epistemology, and the brain sciences. Website