Citation
Favela, Luis H. (2017) Mental representations are not necessary for fish consciousness. Animal Sentience 13(9)
Commentary Type
Invited Commentary
Thread
Michael L. Woodruff, Consciousness in teleosts: There is something it feels like to be a fish
Abstract
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. Central to his argument is the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is representational in nature. I think the commitment to a representational theory of consciousness undermines Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not need to perceive the world indirectly via mental images/representations in order to have phenomenological experiences. My argument is based on considerations of ecological psychology and comparative ethology.
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Cognition and Perception Commons, Cognitive Neuroscience Commons, Evolution Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons, Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology Commons, Zoology Commons