Mark Rowlands, Are animals persons?


Several types of objection have been raised against the arguments I presented in my target article, “Are animals persons?” Among the objections are the following: (1) the claim that animals are persons is of little significance, (2) my use of the Lockean conception of the person is questionable, (3) whether a creature qualifies as a person is a matter of social construction rather than objective fact, (4) reflective consciousness is more important than I realize, (5) my reliance on implicit self-awareness in the account of personhood is ill-advised, (6) my account entails that too many creatures qualify as persons, and (7) types of objection that resist categorization (but I shall argue are sundry misunderstandings). I respond to these objections.

Author Biography

Mark Rowlands, Professor of Philosophy at University of Miami, studies philosophy of mind, ethics and moral psychology. He has written 18 books, including Animal Rights (Macmillan, 1998), The Environmental Crisis (Macmillan, 2000), Animals Like Us (Verso, 2002), The Philosopher and the Wolf (Granta, 2008), and Can Animals Be Moral? (Oxford, 2012).