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Abstract

In his 2024 book, Jonathan Birch builds a precautionary framework for the borderlines of sentience, one that is meant to guide both theoretical reflection and practical action. One of the book’s great merits is its bottom-up approach, which presents itself as theoretically neutral regarding the (neuro-)physiological criteria required for sentience. Yet the singular place granted to midbrain-centric views (e.g., Merker, 2007; Panksepp, 2011; Solms, 2021) and to what Birch calls the “brainstem rule” (Chapter 11) raises questions. What justifies granting it such a central role? What are its practical and theoretical consequences?

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 Generic License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 Generic License

Author Biography

Charlotte Gauvry, Feodor Lynen Fellow, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, King’s College London, is a philosopher of consciousness. Her research, in collaboration with the Department of Epileptology at the University Hospital of Bonn, is on how inferences about consciousness can be extended to atypical neural entities, such as an isolated hemisphere following hemispherotomy. Website

 Nurida Boddenberg, research associate, Faculty of Medicine, University Hospital Bonn, is a philosopher of science. Her research is on scientific realism, philosophy of consciousness, and atypical neurological conditions, particularly hemispherotomy. She is also interested in data-driven approaches to evaluating medical education.

DOI

10.51291/2377-7478.1962

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