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Animal Rights vs. Humanism: The Charge of Speciesism

Kenneth Joel Shapiro

Abstract

The present article examines a concern I have had for some time about the compatibility of humanistic psychology with the emerging animal rights movement. Beyond working out my position, the paper has the additional educational and, frankly, political purpose of bringing animal rights issues to the attention of humanistic psychologists.

The article applies certain concepts of contemporary animal rights philosophy, notably "speciesism," to both the philosophy of humanism and humanistic psychology. While on a philosophical level, certain concepts are discussed that would likely block a rapprochement, I feel that humanistic psychologists as individuals are likely to extend their compassion to nonhuman animals.

A review of philosophical humanism reveals that its important concept of individuality excludes nonhuman animals. Within this conception, animals simply are not individuals. In fact, animals are employed as a categorical foil representing precisely the absence of reason and relative autonomy, hallmarks of individuality.

In humanistic psychology, the concept of self actualization is open to similar charges. A compatibility and, hence a reconciliation, is suggested through a phenomenological rendering of empathy, a second concept critical to humanistic psychology.

Introduction

You probably think humanistic psychology has enough problems with the antihumanistic drift of much of postmodern thought. Derrida's deconstructionism (1976), Barthes' certification of the "death of the author" (1977), and Foucault's archaeology (1973) demolished our sense of identity and worth as human beings, as did science's technologism, the computer's neoformalism, and psychology's continued reductionistic scientism. Then American bornagain fundamentalism recast secular humanism as the devil. Well, here is another problem.

To put it baldly and provocatively, is humanistic psychology speciesist? Is humanism necessarily a position built on the valuing of one species at the expense of others? If it is, is it then compatible with a contemporary animal rights movement which seeks to question and overcome, at least in terms of ethical obligations, most traditional distinctions among animal species?

Beginning with a brief introduction to the animal rights movement, I will offer a reading, first, of the history and
critique of classical humanism, and, second, of the history of humanistic psychology. In the course of that reading, I will examine the nature and grounds of a charge of speciesism against humanism and humanistic psychology, and suggest a way to a satisfactory plea bargain, though not yet to a dismissal of the case.

My credentials as attorney for the defense of humanistic psychology are mixed if not downright suspicious. For the past seven years I have been actively involved in the animal rights movement, primarily through Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, an organization which I co-founded and of which I am currently executive director. A bit more auspiciously for this readership, I identify myself as an existential-phenomenologist, and am a practicing clinician.

Beneath the vagary of bringing you to trial only to defend you, my actual purpose is frankly political. I want to swear you in as vigilantes. I seek to persuade you to join me in doing for rats what you set out to do for humans more than 25 years ago. Following Wertz (1986), I take rats as the symbol of psychology's exploitation of nonhuman animals. I choose the term "exploitation" carefully. Whether or not the use of animals as subjects in laboratory research can be justified in any or all instances, that use is almost entirely for our human benefit, not for animals' benefit, and is, on balance, clearly harmful to them. Hence, they are an exploited group. Together, let us restore to them a full respect for their being and worth. In doing so, we may restore our own.

My brief in short

Since the argument is involved or at least extensive, allow me to highlight it as follows: Taking the Enlightenment as its onset, modern humanistic thought is defined as "free reason." This notion of rationality distinguishes "human" from the God of traditional religious dogma and from nonhuman animals lodged in a prerational nature. Critiques of this move, which so discretely demarcates human being, issue from several quarters—environmentalism, the animal rights movement, and contemporary accounts of the power of various sociohistorical forces (e.g., economic institutions, language, and social science itself). In common, the critiques challenge that discrimination of humans based on their possession of reason, seeing it as a self-serving and arbitrary categorical divide.

An important consequence of the categorical overcorrections into such dichotomies as human/God and human/nonhuman animal, is a methodological overcorrection which denies our access as investigators to all beings, including other human beings, except through the externality of rational inference. This methodological overcorrection is embodied in the natural sciences, which in its modernist form is largely the creation of humanism. Ironically, many developments in contemporary humanism now are critical of this form of science as a significant dehumanizing force.

I introduce the philosophy of animal rights by organizing it around the concept of speciesism. This concept is compared and
contrasted with racism and sexism. A center of the paper is an examination of speciesism as a charge against humanism.

Humanistic psychology is analyzed as the modification of free reason to "free©self." While offering a fuller notion of rationality, I argue that it has not overcome the structural errors of its origins in philosophical humanism. The result is an implicit derogation and distanciation of nonhumans vis©a©vis humans. I suggest a way out of this alienated and ethically questionable position in which humanistic psychology finds itself by replacing self-actualization as its conceptual center with a modified notion of empathy.

The politics of the animal rights movement

Crystallized around the publication of Singer's "Animal Liberation• (1975), the contemporary animal rights movement quickly grew, utilizing various activist, conventional political, legal and extralegal tactics to realize a broad spectrum of goals (MacCauley, 1987; Martin, 1982; and Singer, 1985). Currently, virtually no institution touching on the lives of nonhuman animals escapes its scrutiny. Notable targets are factory farming, product testing, laboratory research, and hunting and trapping. While there is considerable overlap, the movement is distinguishable from environmentalism and deep ecology in its goals and philosophy, particularly its focus on individual animals as the relevant objects of moral concern, rather than on species or ecosystems.

With respect to the issue of the use and treatment of animals in laboratory research, psychology has received a disproportionate share of criticism (egs., Singer, 1975; Rollin, 1981). In fact, two psychologists, one largely through the topic of his research (Wade, 1976) and the other through his treatment of his animal subjects (Rowan, 1984), have provided the "causes cá,áláŠábre• which helped establish and maintain biomedical and psychological research as a major focus of the animal rights movement. More recently, radical factions of the movement have used the tactic of breaking into facilities, making or stealing and disseminating video or other incriminating records of experimental procedures, treatment, and housing conditions. In part fueled by the evidence and limelight so provided, more moderate groups promote the notion of "alternatives" to animal research, borrowing the broad concept of replacement, reduction and refinement from Russell and Burch (1959). The development of alternatives is not an abolitionist program, for it includes attempts to make experimental procedures less invasive (refinement) and to reduce the numbers of animals through design modification, in addition to the full replacement of the use of live animals.

Two publications featuring the presentation of such alternatives are "Alternatives to Laboratory Animals," published by Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments, and "Humane Innovations and Alternatives in Animal Experimentation•, published by Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.â. Other more or less moderate tactics include the constitution of institutional
animal care committees (reviewing bodies modelled after human subject review committees), litigation based on existing state anti-cruelty laws (which, however, exempt research in some states [Leavitt, 1978]), and additional Federal regulation through the Animal Welfare Act and amendments to it.

Unfortunately, the response of the American Psychological Association (APA) through this period has been "one step forward, two back." While developing guidelines which at least recognize levels of invasive use and call for greater justification at more invasive levels (APA, 1985), factions within the APA largely deny the possibility of alternatives in behavioral research (Gallup, 1985), balk at regulations that would meaningfully implement recent Federal animal welfare legislation (such as that providing for the "psychological well-being of primates") (APA, 1986), declaw any mechanism within the profession that would effectively identify alleged abusers (only case investigated from 1982 through 1985; Ethics Committee of the APA, 1986), and block the institution within APA's governance of a committee that would provide advocacy for animal welfare comparable to that established for women and ethnic minorities (Shapiro, 1983).

While humanistic psychology has not been a direct target of the political and activist animal rightists, a number of scholars have pointed to humanistic psychology and to humanism more generally as an underlying philosophic position providing conceptual ground and sustaining justification for current practices involving the exploitation of animals (Clark, 1984; Singer, 1975; Cave, 1982). The story I tell below examines that humanistic foundation.

The concept of speciesism: The derogation and negation of animal interests

The emerging ethic that provides the philosophic foundation of this contemporary animal rights movement (Singer, 1975; Regan, 1983) builds on a concept of speciesism. The term "speciesism" is owed to Ryder (1975, Chap. 1), who defines it as follows:

"`speciesism describe[s] the widespread discrimination that is practiced by man [sic] against the other species...(p.5)"

Singer defines speciesism as:

A prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species" (1975, p.7).

Ryder and Singer both use the term speciesism to invoke parallels to racism and sexism and to thereby legitimate the goals of the animal rights movement as the inevitable next ring in an expanding circle of compassion.

My explication of the concept here prepares the way for a critique of the compatibility of an emerging animal rights ethic with contemporary humanistic psychology. In its rescue of human being from its more or less exclusive study in a laboratory-based positivistic psychology, will an evolving neohumanism take
nonhuman animals with it? Or, will neohumanism abandon animals by continuing the conceptual tactic employed by philosophical humanism of using "animal" as a categorical foil for human being?

By definition, the three concepts of racism, sexism, and speciesism all refer to discrimination that tends to promote or encourage domination and exploitation of members of one group by another. A speciesist prejudice is, then, a political act in the broadest sense. The discriminatory act or policy need not be intentionally exploitative—we have all been caught unwittingly making a remark that justly receives the charge of sexist or racist. Nor need any comparison drawn or implied be false; the comparison need only be an invidious one. As we are all aware in the cases of sexism and racism, often comparisons are empirically true but largely or wholly a result of the history of discrimination itself. More insidiously, the very differences created by a pattern of discrimination are then relabelled to justify continued discrimination. For example, laziness and emotionality, more aptly labelled lack of opportunity and expression of frustration, are used to rationalize the exclusion of a group of individuals from the right to participate in an economic or political process.

Another layer of what soon becomes a recalcitrant and self-perpetuating phenomenon results from the fact that often the attribute selected as the basis of a sexist or racist or speciesist comparison is irrelevant to the discrimination it purports to justify. Examples are certain cosmetic, physical, and intellectual attributes. When habitually practiced, discrimination by the members of one class against another causes the discriminators to think differently about their victims and to use different language to refer to them, thus intensifying the prejudice. Classes at least generically equivalent are, nonetheless, arrayed hierarchically: we speak of the stronger and weaker or second sex, and higher and lower animals. As Midgley points out, the latter metaphor of height applied to animal species is inappropriate even in terms of evolutionary theory. "The truth is, there can be no evolutionary ladder. Creatures diverge,..., each finding its own characteristic sort of fulfillment" (1978, p. 159). Rather than evolutionary ladder, a metaphor derived from the pre-Darwinian "great chain of being", she suggests a bush, that is a radial rather a hierarchical arrangement of the species.

Animals as objects of moral concern

To make a credible charge that certain institutionalized practices are examples of speciesism, the victims must be established to be objects of worth or value. Of course, the argument by animal rightists that animals are not so valued because of speciesism, while no doubt true, offers little purchase. The tack taken by most contemporary philosophers of animal ethics, including the two major thinkers, Singer and Regan, is to argue the worth of animals by establishing that they are, obligatorily, "objects of moral concern" (Singer, 1975). To make this claim they first elucidate the relevant criterion for
any entity to be an object of moral concern. What is it about a being that obligates us to treat it with consideration of the right and wrong of our action in regard to it? Both Singer and Regan rule out certain features often attributed exclusively to human beings, such as rationality, intelligence, or language. Following Bentham's utilitarianism, Singer argues that sentience, particularly the capacity for enjoyment and pain, is the relevant aspect. Since there are consequences of our actions in regard to nonhuman animals of which they can be aware, it follows that they have "interests" and that we owe them, ethically, "equal consideration of their interests." Incidentally, Singer does not extend the claim of "interests" to plants for, in his utilitarian account, they do not feel pain or suffering. Hence, he would not follow Stone (1974) in claiming legal standing for trees on the basis of their having interests that can be violated. (Stone recently retracted this particular claim for standing, calling trees "disinteresteds", and arguing a somewhat weaker legal status for natural objects [Varner, 1987]).

Regan argues that the morally relevant aspect of animal being is that animals are the "subjects of a life." By virtue of this morally relevant criterion, he moves beyond Singer's utilitarian position to the claim that they are right-bearers and we must take their rights into consideration. This means that a nonhuman animal is an individual with natural rights and that under certain circumstances the rights of that individual must trump or preempt the rights of a group (Dworkin, 1977). Other philosophers take purpose (Caplan, 1983) or telos (Rollin, 1981) as the requisite morally relevant aspect.

Ryder and Singer convincingly establish the similarities between the conceptual structure of speciesism and of racism and sexism, and show striking parallels in the kind of arguments that have issued from these prejudices in different historical periods. In her recent book, Spiegel (1988) presents a more extended study of what she calls the dreaded comparison between our treatment of blacks historically and of nonhuman animals presently. Let me briefly indicate one or two additional similarities and apparent differences as well, some of which suggest certain complexities for a concept of speciesism.

Racists and sexists clearly both discriminate against certain individuals by denigrating a group of which those individuals are members. However, to a more exclusive extent than these, a speciesist further and more subtly discriminates by "reifying" those categories of species of which he or she is not a member. When we speak of "the black" and of "women" our referent tends to be a stereotypic individual. Further, when we speak of, for example, "the status of women in contemporary society," we intend a prototype as it is instantiated by the aggregate of individual women. However, when we speak of, for example, culling deer or the regrettable decline of the mountain gorilla or the market value of chicken, our primary referent is a supra-entity, the species. Managing wildlife through culling and harvesting is precisely for the sake of the species instead of consideration of individual members of the species. Individual members are forgotten as objects of concern by a device of
semantic absorption of individuals into a now reified class as object.

This is ironic, for there is an extensive literature in the philosophy of biology on the controversial question of whether a species is "objectively real" (see Mayr, 1942; and Munson, 1971, section: The existence of species). It suggests that species are classes, that is abstract, non-spatiotemporal rather than "concrete entities" (Gregg, in Munson, p. 243). To think "species" otherwise is, in part, a result of "the insidiously misleading use of class expressions in place of individual expressions; e.g., "'This species nests in oak trees' for '"the members of this species nest in oak trees..."' (Greg, in Munson, p. 243). In this way, the discrimination of one species against other species is effected by a logico-linguistic sleight of hand wherein the latter are reified. Even when done in "humane" or ecological contexts, this misleading reification perpetuates a cryptospeciesism. By way of clarification of terms: "Speciation" refers to division into species; while "pseudospeciation", a term coined by Erikson (1985), refers to such divisions which clearly violate even a moderately informed biology. By contrast, "speciesism" refers to discrimination against an individual or group of individuals on the basis of species membership. "Cryptospeciesism," then, refers to such discrimination that, while occurring in the context of practices that are apparently benevolent, are likely to have insidious effects.

Adding to Ryder and Singer's concept, then, any position is likely to be speciesist that gives consideration to a species as a whole by the semantic-based ontological reversal of treating that abstract class as a primary reality, in radical disregard for the existence of the concrete individual members of that class. "The coyote is making a comeback in Maine," is a cryptospeciesist statement by this analysis. This is, then, a form of discrimination that operates by the radical dissolution of the individual in species other than one's own.

"The case for the prosecution: classical humanism's over-valuing of individual human interest

That humanism gives itself a species name and that it takes one species as its exclusive object of study and concern both offer a certain "prima facie" argument in support of the charge of speciesism against it. But, surely, humanists are justified in circumscribing the scope of their interests; specializing and taking as a name that area of specialty is no crime. However, the charge runs deeper and implicates the underlying philosophic tradition that constitutes humanistic thought. To assess the case against what Cave refers to as "the tradition of humanistic speciesism" (1982, p. 251); to understand the prominent place Singer gives to the critique of humanism in his philosophy (1975, p. 205 ff.), the strength of Clark's "detest[ation of]...transcendental humanists" (1984, p. 7), and Kohaks' charge of humanism's role in the "heedless egotism of our species" (1984, p. 110), we must offer an account of that philosophy.
Humanism as rationalism

In the standard account, (e.g., Kurtz, 1973), humanism is a development of the Enlightenment that revives and revises the Roman humanitas to furnish a critique and alternative to medieval scholasticism. Humanism defines and names itself by describing a new way of life centering on "human interest instead of religious or transcendental interest. To accomplish this shift, human is defined as the locus of reason. Given the tyranny of late medieval thought and institutions, this concept of reason had to be closely connected to individual freedom. Reason is offered as a form of thought that is at once free and freeing, free in the sense that it can operate outside of the dogmatism, prejudice, and irrationality of medieval ideology. Through the application of free reason, a human being can become free: he or she can become his or her own master, take his or her reasonable self as the final and only authority. The concept of free reason, then, is an ontological position, for it defines human being. It is also an epistemological and, eventually, a methodological position, for the ideal of free thought provides "a method of free inquiry and critical intelligence" (Kurtz, 1973, p. 182). Through reason, human being becomes a "person" in the modernist sense of a relatively undetermined, separate and autonomous being that can objectively know other beings. While humanism takes the name of a species and defines and circumscribes a group, it is a philosophy that values the "individual", not a group or collectivity.

The critique of rationality

Clearly, much modern thought, culminating in postmodernism, offers a critique of that valuing of the person, particularly of individual freedom and autonomy. With Hegel (history), with Freud and behaviorism (psychology), with Marx and modern sociology (certain economic and social institutions), we have seen that certain forces larger than the person shape him or her. We are not fully independent or autonomous beings founded in a free reason. Language itself has been recognized as a force which challenges humanism's foundation in an autonomous reason and intentional subject. Structuralism, poststructuralism, and Foucault's archaeology give language a status as structure or sociohistorical event beneath which we as human subject, agent, and consciousness are subordinated. "Man" is a conduit of language, or "...man is an invention of recent date" (Foucault, 1973, p. 387).

In the context of our concern with the charge of speciesism, humanism's claims of the freedom and foundationalist status of reason and of the primacy of the individual are not by themselves a problem. Rather, it is the further claim that reason and individuality are invested exclusively in human being. The ancient motto from Protagoras, "'Man' is the measure of all things," has come to mean not only that reason is the only standard, but that human being is the only embodiment and executor of that measure.

Classical humanism
The history of classical humanism can be schematically presented as the tension between human being so construed as the originary, individual or self-determining, exclusive locus of reason and other competing centers of authority and determinative power, as follows:

humanism: reason, free thought

1. God
2. nature
3. other large forces: society, history, language
4. science, technology

In the initial move, God and the superrational are transformed into reason which is then invested in human being. The church's claim of the existence of a transcendent rationality is expropriated and placed in the world. However, to consolidate this position further, human is then radically distinguished from nonhuman animal with the claim that human being is the exclusive repository of that now worldly reason. As part of the same move, human being divests itself, at least in terms of those features that are essential and valued, of a certain instinct and need-dominated emotionality by transferring it to nonhuman animals. In fact, the word chosen to carry these now inhuman or at least inessential human aspects is, precisely, "animal."

Given the two terms' respective etymologies, the fact of this choice and the currency of its usage is an ironic achievement. All animals are the etymological offspring of that peculiar class of life forms that are endowed with breath or soul (Latin: "anima"), spirit or mind (Latin: "animus"), and are quickened (Latin: "animare"), that is move on their own accord. On the other hand, "human" comes from the Latin "Humus", for mould, ground, soil. The formidableness of this achievement is further displayed by contrasting it with a comparable move that helps sustain sexism. In its vocabulary, "man" is the generic category under which are subsumed the two sexes, male and female. In effect, by making a superordinate out of a subcategory, a linguistic structure is formed that lifts one sex up at the expense of the second. A categorical hegemony corresponds with and legitimates institutional discriminatory practice. However, by contrast, to help create humanism, the generic "animal" under which human was subsumed with all the other species, is now reduced to a subordinate categorical position.

In any case, these moves which both deny reason to nonhuman animals and base motives to humans, at least as an essential feature, create a categorical gulf between human and nonhuman animals, between, now, human and animal. Of course, the intellectual contexts that make these moves possible are the Christian and Cartesian distinctions, respectively, between spirit/flesh and mind/body. (In her recent treatment of the
origin of the Christian version of this distinction, Pagels [1988] shows that it is Augustine who develops the view that individuals, following Adam's sin, are no longer free. "Fleshly desire" is a symptom of bodily powers that are irresistible and that necessarily corrupt the will.) In effect, "human" becomes essentially mental and reasonable, while "animal" is constituted as bodily, irrational and emotional, in a degraded and biologized sense of the latter term.

Animals are not individuals

Further, "animal" is deindividuated, for reason is the "sine non qua" of person or individual. A being that is not essentially free reason is not autonomous, is not an individual in the peculiarly humanistic sense. In effect, a reference to the class human signifies an aggregate of individuals; conversely, a reference to one animal only thinly conceals a reference to an abstract class.

Having constructed this categorical chasm of reason/unreason and, based on it, of individual/abstract group, humanism then offers the exclusive stuff of its own newfound essential being as the only bridge across that chasm. (My analysis here is influenced by Foucault's account of the social construction of "madness" [1965]). If animals are different from us in lacking reason and personhood and we are reasonable, we can only know them through reason. The commonsensical observation from everyday experience that we have some knowledge of the intentions and experience of a nonhuman animal without the mediation of reason is denied. But surely, I know my dog's intention to go outside or his or her pain when I accidentally step on his or her tail by something closer to immediate apprehension than through logical deduction or some other rational inferential process. The denial of this access requires an enterprise of experts in reason so that we might (once again) understand these now radically "other" nonhuman and nonindividual animals. Through an objective, external investigatory posture based on inferential reason, a natural science arises which claims to provide the only possible intelligent access to animals and nature. Eventually, under the auspices of this humanistically inspired scientific method, animal and nature are reduced to matter in motion, effectively becoming a dead region of being. Insidiously, we actually come to experience the "natural," including the kingdom of animals, precisely as this Galilean nature construct, losing touch with our former participation in a natural rhythm and living atmosphere (Kohaks, 1984).

The Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock, 1979) may be seen as a recent attempt to recover a living nature and, with it, our lived relation to both animate and inanimate nature. In its original and strong form, recently weakened, Lovelock describes Earth itself as a living entity, a kind of superorganism. I welcome the attempt to revivify nature, including inanimate life, and our relation to it. However, in the context of the present paper, I interpret this move as an overcorrection at the other end of the array of life --the animal/plant rather than the human/animal end.
Of necessity, I have limited my critique here to attempts to establish a discrete line between human and animal. In doing so, in seeking to blur the human/animal line, we are not required to establish a strong distinction between animal, now including human, and plant life. However, my view is that a number of contemporary descriptions of the animal/plant and even the living/nonliving interfaces inappropriately blur these latter two distinctions. I have already referred to Stone's attribution, now recanted, of interests to plants. I also include in these errors on the far side of animality, Aldo Leopold's concept of community applied to "the land", which includes soils, waters, plants and animals (1949, p. 239) and Hartshorne's panpsychic process philosophy which attributes weak forms of sentience and individuality to plants and rocks (Dombrowski, 1988). My position is closer to that of Hans Jonas, who maintains a strong distinction between the "vegetative mode of life" and the "phenomenon of animality" through a concept of distance©© the gap between "urge and attainment", between organism and environment (1966).

Animals are not subjects

Methodologically, animals become inaccessible except through the distance of objective observation and inference. Initially having been denied rational intelligence, this investigatory posture toward animals allows humans to deny them intention and purpose as well. They are no longer subjects of a world. More subtly, aside from these results of this behavioristic radicalization of external observation, investigators are only apparently taking nonhuman animals as the object of their study. Having defined animal largely in contradistinction to human and as the embodiment of certain undesirable features of the human, they select topic areas and construct research variables in terms of, and to confirm, these categorical distinctions. For example, they frame the study of language in animals with a certain definitive notion of the syntax of human language. Ironically, so biased, they generally find themselves in retreat, for as their estimate of the capacities of nonhuman animal powers enlarges, they must constrict their placement of the categorical battle lines between human and animal: if not rationality, language; if not language, syntax; if not syntax, symbol manipulation; if not that, self-awareness.... As Clark (1984) states, "it is not that we have "discovered" them to lack a language but rather that we define, and redefine, what Language is by discovering what beasts do not have" (p. 96, his emphasis). The categorical chasm is maintained.

A second strategy made possible by assigning high value exclusively to human beings is our use of the nonhuman as a model for the study of humans. This type of investigation is not directed to an understanding of the nonhuman animal itself but to the understanding of human beings. If nonhuman animals do not reason and are not individuals, then they are not objects of moral concern. Therefore, they can be manipulated, afflicted with disease, deprived, socially isolated, addicted, driven crazy,
aversively conditioned, and the like. In addition to being speciesist, this treatment of them is contradictory, for it is premised on and justified by both the similarity and differentness of human and nonhuman animals (Ryder, 1975, p. 2).

To sum the brief against humanism: Humanism led to a modernity that is now under attack for its claims regarding a fictive encapsulated, "free" individual; scientific humanism led to a positivistic methodology under attack in both the natural and social sciences.

In the present reading, classical humanism's rendering of human being as free reason was both a categorical and methodological overcorrection. Categorically, it radically separated human from nonhuman animals on the basis of the former's alleged exclusive possession of reason. Further, it overvalued individuality as the reason-based locus of freedom. If only a human is an individual, then a nonhuman animal must be stripped of his or her individuality. Further, once an individual is diminished in value in this way, the primary focus of consideration becomes a new entity constructed out of an abstract grouping of such former individuals--"species" is reified.

A methodological overcorrection was built on similar grounds. In addition to locating reason only in human being, it further claimed for reason the only access to truth. Thereby, it denied our empathic sense of knowing and being with nonhuman animals.

When we humans conceptualized a free human individual and placed high value on individual human interests, when we denied reason and individuality to nonhuman animals, when we developed the methods that distanced us from nonhuman animals, and when we abstracted and objectified the natural world, we provided a framework powerfully conducive to speciesism.

By way of qualification, I am not providing in this brief space historical evidence for the rise of speciesism out of humanism. My claim is the more modest one that, based on conceptual analysis, classical humanism allowed, encouraged, almost demanded a speciesist attitude to nonhuman animals.

Despite their etymological beginnings in association with air, spirit, and mind, it is they, the nonhuman animals, not we humans, who in our imagination became dirt, dirty impulses, unreasoned instinct, the beast. Despite their association with free or autonomous movement, it is nonhuman animals, not we, who became object, manageable resource, meat on the hoof, immobilized experimental preparation, beings-for-us

A Humanistic psychology

Presumably, humanistic psychology both emerges out of humanistic philosophy, in that it is a humanism, and leaves it behind, in that it is a psychology. My examination of it here is necessarily hampered by the facts that we are close to it in time and perspective and that, after more than a quarter of a century of development, it is hardly a monolithic enterprise (Smith, 1986, p. 8). In the present reading I will take two concepts as constitutive—self-actualization (..."the central concept in
humanistic psychology...“[Lethbridge, 1986, p. 87]) and empathy (Rogers, 1980). If conceptual neatness were the order of the day, the twin overcorrections considered earlier would be corrected by these two concepts. Self-actualization would replace reason and blur the human/animal categorical distinction; while empathy would replace independent observation and inference as an exclusive investigatory posture, diminishing the distance and exploitation of nonhuman animals supported by the natural scientific method. Since the situation is more complicated and such corrections have not, perhaps cannot, be realized through these concepts, I take the above proposition only as an organizing hypothesis.

Of course, the immediate context of the rising tide of humanistic psychology, the "third force," is as a critique of psychoanalytic and behavioristic psychology. In Wertz's account, "The Rat in Psychological Science" (1986), a humanistic science was required to rescue "human existence" from a "split" into the "forbidden private intentions," the shadowy underworld of the Freudian unconscious on the one hand, and the "controlled behavior" of the early mechanistic behaviorism on the other (p. 152). I am sympathetic with Wertz's critique of scientific psychology's "transposing the laboratory mode of existence onto non-laboratory human life" (p. 156) and, at least generally, with his suggestions for a "radical humanism" or human science that might more fully salvage human being. However, my concern here is whether this rescue operation, begun with the early rise of the third force and continuing now with certain developments influencing it (such as phenomenological psychology [Giorgi, 1970] and narratology [Ricoeur, 1984]) will take nonhuman animals with it or abandon them in the laboratory. In the tradition of classical humanism, will it perpetuate the use of "animal" as a categorical foil?

In this regard, Wertz's piece itself is problematic. His ingenious hermeneutic reading of psychology through the image of the rat features the black rat as the "dark side of man" (p. 146) of psychoanalysis, while the white rat is the sterilized, denatured, "scientized" construction of behaviorism. While these social constructions of the rat have obviously had enormous impact on rats and the images have come to reflect, in part, the reality of some of those animals, there is a rat, between, as it were, the black and white rat. Wertz only refers to this rat in passing for, quoting Zinsser, he reaches with him "the inevitable conclusion: 'There is nothing that can be said in its [the rat's] favor!'" (p. 145). But a fuller account of rats, of their marvelous physical and intellective abilities, of their social organization and their "traditional transmission of experiences" within their communities, and even their "immaculateness" prior to their exposure to "soiling by civilization" into the "dirty rat" is available (Hendrickson, 1983). Rats in nature are formidable beings and well worthy of our respect. With Wertz, I agree that for psychology to build a science on images of the rat is a "serious betrayal of humanity" (p. 165). However, in the present context, I must point to his omission of the fact that it is a serious betrayal of animality as well.
If Wertz's radical humanism were realized, the consideration that it would give to animals is not clear. Will our view of animals be limited, as it is in Wertz's article, to using them as objects that allow us to hold "the mirror before humanity" (p. 164) within a science whose apparently exclusive purpose is to serve humanity? Of course, to so limit consideration of animals would be to deny them full and equal consideration of their interests.

Even if largely limiting animals' function to a symbolic one, Wertz's piece is unusual in humanistic psychological literature in its inclusion of nonhuman animals. It is typical in its more or less exclusive concern with the concept of humanness (Smith, 1986, p. 23) and in its effort to identify or constitute a more fully human being and a more fully human science. Again, such a project is not necessarily speciesist. Historically, however, efforts to ennoble humanity rarely escape taking nonhuman animals as the fall guy (Shepard, 1965, p. 248). An enterprise and ideology bent on such ennoblement tends to promote, referring back to Singer's definition, "...a prejudice or act of bias toward the interests of one's own species..."

As we, for example, restore intention and purpose as constitutive of human being, will we also restore it to animals? Will they accompany us in our escape from the laboratory, that hall of mirrors in which we constructed them as "the beast" and as "controllable", predictable object? Let us look more closely at prominent constitutive concepts in humanistic psychology to further assess the current and future status of nonhuman animals in a humanistic psychology.

Broadening reason to experience

By contrast to classical humanism, humanistic psychology invokes a much broader concept of reason which includes all consciousness or experience, and which emphasizes, in particular, "visceral experiencing (Rogers, 1980, p. 159), or "felt-meaning" (Gendlin, 1962), or "what you really feel... (Barton, 1974). In the present context, upgrading, roughly speaking, the emotional aspects of experience to greater parity with reason loosens the tyranny of logical deduction and lightens the overburdened associations of human with reason and nonhuman animals with emotion. This leaves an opening for a less discrete human/nonhuman animal distinction. As we will see in a moment, it also allows the restoration of the body, particularly the lived body that was given up for the sake of a disembodied, formalistic notion of pure reason. However, as part of the same move emotion is linked to imagination, creativity, and spirituality, in a word to the "farther reaches of human nature" and the program of a human potential movement. Thereby, a new ground of a human/nonhuman animal categorical cleavage is created. It is not clear, then, whether this shift from a biologized and degraded view of emotionality and the body has redeemed animality.

Self-actualization
In any case the emphasis on feelings is part of a more primary concept in humanistic psychology, that of self-actualization. Maslow describes it as a "tendency to growth or self-perfection" 1962, p. 21). This concept retains the classical humanistic emphasis on and close linkage of individuality and freedom. Individuality is the realization of a largely a priori set of "talents, capacities, and potentialities" (p. 27) that include the physical, emotional, social and moral as well as the intellective. Reasoning is no longer given special status in this process.

There is an ambiguity here, though in the emphasis on individuality, for there is also an insistence in both Maslow and Rogers on certain "universal" features that emerge with or through self-actualization. As Barton states with reference to Roger's client-centered therapy, the self realized is a self that consists of certain needs and characteristics, "a self that transcends any particular individual (1974, p. 190).

With respect to freedom, the self realized through the self-actualization process, the only authentic self, is precisely the definition of a free self. It is free in that it unfolds independently of external determination. In the case of a free self, the social environment's function is limited to the provision of a generalized nourishment or fostering or facilitating acceptance. Unlike in classical humanism, in this concept of individual freedom reason does not play the critical role. The self-actualizing tendency itself, not reasoning, safeguards and constitutes freedom through the realization of "all aspects of one's given inner nature."

Maslow's discussion takes human being as its subject. What does he intend with respect to nonhuman animals? As does Rogers (1965, p. 489), he gives Goldstein's work a seminal place in the origin of the concept of self-actualization (p. 21). While we cannot do justice to Goldstein's position here (see Grene, 1965, chapter 5), suffice to say that he used the term to refer to human and nonhuman animals ("organisms"). Clearly, as a philosophical biologist, he intended self-actualization to apply across species.

However, Maslow draws a strong distinction between deficiency or basic or instinctoid and growth needs or motives, between a motivation based on tension reduction, defense, and conservation, and one based on self-perfection (pp. 20-21). The latter is the heart of his version of the concept of self actualization. With respect to nonhuman animals, then, he states, "It may be that animals have only deficiency needs. Whether or not this turns out to be so, in any case we have treated animals as if this were so..." (p. 25). Certainly, contemporary ethological literature shows that it did not turn out to be so. (See, for example, Goodall's [1986] description of sophisticated aspects of chimpanzees.) In any case, clearly Maslow largely accepted a rough dichotomy, comparable to the traditional higher/lower animals, between deficiency and growth needs, where only the latter applied to humans. Further, only the growth needs can be met independently of the environment, and, therefore, only human beings can be free individuals or free selves (pp. 310-2). From my point of view this is an arrangement
that is structurally similar to the human/animal, reason/unreason dichotomized hierarchy of classical humanism.

There is a considerable critique of self-actualization both within (Smith, 1972; Geller, 1982; Lethbridge, 1986; Shaw and Colimore, 1988; Daniels, 1988; and Wilson, 1988) and without humanistic psychology (Wallach and Wallach, 1983, chapters 7,8). Lethbridge summarizes the attack from within in terms of the "asocial, ahistorical, and innate" self that is to be actualized (p. 85). Following Nord (p. 89) and from his own Marxist position, he also criticizes humanistic psychology's concept of person for its underestimation of the role of social and economic forces in the shaping of the individual. In the terms of my analysis, Maslow's position is an overcorrection that denies the power of other large forces as competing centers of determinative power. As in the classical humanistic self, the self as conceived by Maslow is hyper-independent, encapsulated, dissociated from the world.

Developments within humanistic psychology since Maslow have attempted to complement this encapsulated self with the belated recognition that individual growth and self definition are necessarily functions of reciprocal influence between individual and society (Simpson, 1977; and Wilson, 1988). Nonetheless, this highly individualistic notion of the natural unfolding and expression of a given or inner self may be interpreted as an Americanization of classical humanism. Maslow and Roger's work continues the line of Emerson's self-reliance, Thoreau's retreat from and disavowal of society's laws and ways, and Whitman's "I celebrate myself..." A recent essay (Marx, 1987) describes this Emersonian revival, although without connecting Maslow or Rogers to it.

It is not clear that Sipe's (1986) and Lethbridge's (1986) attempts to graft onto self-actualization an individual/social dialectic and a genuine social theory of change can or should save this concept as the concept for humanistic psychology. For these changes strike at the heart of Maslow and Roger's faith in an essentially monadic self that is ideally only nourished, not formed or even coconstituted, and certainly not socially constructed by and in the world. The thrust of postmodern thought suggests we abandon that notion of a natural or biologically given self (as well as the freely chosen, nothing self of a radical existentialism and the transcended and negated self of Buddhism [Fontana, 1987]).

While self-actualization as an organizing concept of person originates in a biology of all animals, as appropriated by humanistic psychology it reinstates a categorical divide which is then vulnerable to speciesist attitudes and discrimination, exemplified by Ehrenfeld's charge of arrogance (1978) and Lasch's charge of narcissism (1979). Further, while Goldstein's original conception emphasized holism, an organism embedded in a field, we are left with a view of self that deemphasizes the radical embeddedness of such part-whole relations. For this reason and in that it limits itself to humans, such a concept of self is unlikely to produce a concrete concern for the plight of individual nonhuman animals. In those moments when it does foster an identification of self with world, rather than with the internal unfolding process of self-realization, that
identification is likely to be limited to a global sympathy with an abstract or generalized natural world. A study by Duhl (1986) illustrates this in its evocation of a metaphoric relation between self and sky.

Empathy

Given the critique of the concept of self-actualization, I believe we should put more burden on a concept of empathy to sustain a humanistic psychology. Already in humanistic psychology there is at least the kernel of a more adequate concept of an empathic self that both might allow the lowering of the categorical divide between human and nonhuman animal, and serve as the basis of a methodology broadened beyond the constraints of a positivistic science. In the remainder of this paper I provide a brief critique of the current concept of empathy and suggest a direction for its modification. In an earlier paper, I more fully explicate a concept of empathy (in press).

For the later Rogers, despite its titular role as "a way of being" (1980), empathy remains limited in role to a therapeutic and educational tactic. It is a means provided to a person to help him or her self-actualize. While it is claimed that the actualized self tends toward altruism, community, and empathy, the latter is not taken as a primary constitutive feature of the self. In part through the empathy of the therapist/teacher, the client/student is enabled to be more sensitive to an experiencing self known through an internal focus. The primary move of the client is not to become the therapist or as the therapist, as the client would if he or she became empathic. Rather, the client becomes the unique self that was already there internally, waiting to be realized. Empathy is derivative of this self and in its service. Employing the work of Buber, Friedman (1976) makes the stronger criticism that focus on the world or on the other person, not on the self directly, is the only way to realize the self. In his terms, the self cannot be realized by "aiming at the self."

Clearly, a concept of empathy subordinated to the self of the self-actualization process is burdened by the ontological shortcomings of the encapsulated self. If a person is not originally in the world in the sense of being out there and having direct access to others, he or she can not know that world except by inference or analogy. It follows that no genuine, worldly, engaged empathy is possible.

Methodological limitations follow from this ontology, as I have discussed. For all his faith in the therapist's capacity for empathy, Rogers did not build an investigatory method on a radical or genuine concept of empathy. Instead of the investigator as an involved participant who knows the other through immediate apprehension or intuition, Rogers as investigator remains much closer to a traditional investigative posture in which separation and distance require external inference. In the terms of my analysis here, Rogers' methodology operates well within the rubric of the classical concept of reason.
Empathy as bodily habitation

In various literatures in Eastern philosophy, in feminist theory, and in existential phenomenology, there are accounts of a self that is radically "in relation"--in the world. In existential phenomenology there are at least two seminal accounts of a concept of empathy which give it a more genuinely constitutive status for human being and a potentially more radical role in an investigatory enterprise: Heidegger's description of "dasein• as an open responsiveness and attunement that lets be (1962) and Merleau-Ponty's notion of inhabitation (1962). For the Merleau-Ponty of "Phenomenology of Perception, the body is the condition for the possibility of our immediate apprehension of the world. In the ordinary course of living, we do not know objects by inference or representation but by a direct access to them made possible by the mobility of our body. Through our bodily scheme, we can virtually or potentially inhabit an object and know it from its point of view, as if it could see.

For Merleau-Ponty, the body that inhabits objects does so by carrying with it a rich sense of already being informed by objects in the world. The lived body is an open system, an evolving repertoire of the moves made in coming to know the world. As Merleau-Ponty was influenced by Goldstein's work (1963), this conception of the person is sympathetic to Goldstein's notion of holism or embeddedness.

This rendering of empathy as bodily inhabitation is not limited to the apprehension of physical based vantage points of inanimate "viewers" (in Merleau-Ponty's example, the lamp on the table's view of the chimney [p. 68]). Sociality is based on our originary inclination to inhabit each other's point of view in the full sense of that term--to apprehend the style and substance of each other's intended world.

However, our sociality is not limited to humans. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, early philosophical biologists such as Plessner and Portmann, and contemporary ethology, I have shown elsewhere, that nonhuman animals have and are a point of view (Shapiro, 1987). Nonhuman animals live in a largely prelinguistic yet meaningful world which they know through their own lived body. My dog knows the living room where he and I play as a set of paths traversed and paths prohibited by custom: the sofa he is not allowed on, or physically, the table he cannot fit under. He knows my maneuvers to catch him, including my feints and deceits. His intelligence is largely bodily for it consists of a sense of a potential space and correlative potential moves©©of paths to be traversed, of secure spots to hide or keep warm in or from which to keep watch, of territory staked out, of social relations to be enacted. An animal's experience is of a phenomenal field, of a possible lived space with respect to which he or she is a center of action. On an implicit bodily level, he or she takes up a position and establishes a place©©his home, or playing room, or territory.
Under the term "kinesthetic empathy" (Shapiro, in press), I describe a method for the study of nonhuman animals based on the possibility of direct apprehension of his or her lived body and its correlative "umwelt." The methodology is mixed, integrating knowledge of the history of the individual animal and explication of the social construction of that animal (as "pet", favored species, or the like). However, it relies on the possibility of empathizing with the postures and movements of an individual animal, critically tempered and informed by that history and social construction. As investigator, I can know the space of his world by kinesthetically empathizing with his bodily postures, inclinations and moves. Empathy is not limited to an access to affective life, nor to some perceptible surface of the other being beneath which lurks an inner life only suggested. Rather, we can empathize body to body with a preferred position (my dog's combined look-out, secure lair on our stairway landing) or an intended behavior (his intention to go outdoors). Despite the pitfalls of anthropomorphizing or "projecting," the claim is made that we, in principle, can (and in our daily living do) relate to individual animals through direct understanding of their intentions, inclinations, and interests. This is possible because we share with them an intelligence based on our respective bodily involvement in the world. Both human and nonhuman animals move, know the world through that movement, and have a sense of our moves. In a word, we are all embodied consciousnesses.

In the present context, I am suggesting the possibility of a humanistic psychology built ontologically and methodologically on a modified concept of empathy. It would give empathy constitutive status in human being and allow us genuine access to each other and to nonhuman animals. Unlike a notion of reason that separates us from nonhuman animals and a notion of self-actualization that gives us a self-centered focus, this concept of person precisely puts us out there with other beings.

A psychology based on empathy does not require that we assert that humans are indistinguishable from animals. Nonhuman animals can have a bodily sense of our intentions, can empathize kinesthetically. However, unlike us, they cannot reflect on their empathic belonging. The animal "...is a self, but does not yet "have" a self to which in turn it can take a stand in reflective awareness" (Greene, on Plessner, 1965, p. 99). In other terms, the animal, as a living body possessed by a subject, is an individual; but one that cannot know itself as such. Of course, the most insidious forms of exploitation can follow upon our human capacity for reflective empathy, but it is also the ground for the possibility of an ethic of respect for other ways of being. A humanistic psychology based on a genuine empathy allows us and obligates us to live with each other and with other beings without the distanciation, denial of intimacy and self-centeredness rationalized by the encapsulated self. Through it, there is a possible compatibility between humanistic psychology and animal r


Shapiro, K. (1987, August). What it is to be a dog: Preliminary thoughts on the application of qualitative methods to the study of nonhuman animal. Paper presented at meeting of Qualitative Research in Psychology, Perugia, Italy.


