Benz-Schwarzburg, Judith (2016) What do we owe animals as persons?. Animal Sentience 10(9)
Mark Rowlands, Are animals persons?
Rowlands (2016) concentrates strictly on the metaphysical concept of person, but his notion of animal personhood bears a moral dimension (Monsó, 2016). His definition of pre-reflective self-awareness has a focus on sentience and on the lived body of a person as well as on her implicit awareness of her own goals. Interestingly, these also play a key role in animal welfare science, as well as in animal rights theories that value the interests of animals. Thus, Rowlands’s concept shows connectivity with both major fields of animal ethics. His metaphysical arguments might indeed contain a strong answer to the question of what we owe animals as persons.
Behavior and Ethology Commons, Cognition and Perception Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Evolution Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons